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1. Introduction
In recent years, the use of derivative instruments by municipalities has attracted much attention
from the popular press.1 The heightened attention was mainly due to highly publicized cases of ill-
managed derivative deals that cost the taxpayers billions of dollars and pushed some municipalities
to the brink of financial collapse. For instance, Jefferson County, Alabama filed for bankruptcy in Novem-
ber 2011 – the most expensive U.S. municipal bankruptcy at the time – primarily due to ballooning
financial liabilities brought about by imprudent use of interest rate swaps related to a series of sewer
debt issues (Braun, 2009; McDonald, 2010; Nolan, 2011). Bets gone wrong on derivative transactions cost
the City of Detroit close to $400 million (Christoff and Preston, 2013; Francis et al., 2009).2 According to a
2010 report by Bloomberg News, ill-conceived derivative contracts entered into by governmental entities
have cost the U.S. taxpayer more than $4 billion since 2008 in termination fees alone (McDonald, 2010).
Notwithstanding these highly publicized cases of mismanagement, it is argued that municipal deriva-
tives are beneficial to the taxpayer not only because they reduce risk, but also because they reduce
(interest) expenses associated with debt issues (Dodd, 2010).
While the body of both theoretical and empirical research on derivative usage by the corporate sec-
tor is vast, little to no research exists in the domain of derivatives usage by municipalities. Conse-
quently, our understanding of this issue that has significant public policy implications is very
limited. Why do municipalities use derivatives? Specifically, what are the determinants of their
derivative usage? Is municipal derivative usage consistent with serving the taxpayer or self-serving
opportunistic behavior by officials? This paper aims to answer some of these questions by analyzing
a comprehensive, hand-collected dataset of derivative usage by the largest cities and counties in the U.
S. over the period of 2005–2008. Our sample consists of over 300 observations from 61 cities with pop-
ulations of over 250,000 and 25 counties with populations of over 1,000,000.
We begin our analysis by examining the nature and the extent of derivative usage in our sample.
55% of our sample municipalities (58% of cities and 46% of counties) engage in derivative transactions.
Among the derivative users, the extent of usage is quite significant with the notional values amount-
ing to $574.3 million on average ($667.8 million for cities and $285.6 million for counties).
The vast majority of derivatives relate to managing interest-rate risk. 92% of derivative users (95%
of derivative user cities and 82% of derivative user counties) employ interest rate derivatives while
11% of users (seven percent of derivative user cities and 22% of derivative user counties) employ
exchange rate derivatives. Among derivative users, only three percent (four percent of derivative user
cities and zero percent of derivative user counties) use derivatives associated with commodity prices.
The dominance of interest rate derivatives is even greater in terms of the notional value. Based on
notional value, 98% of all derivatives held (99% for cities and 95% for counties) are interest rate deriva-
tives. Swaps are the most popular derivative instrument among U.S. municipalities with 83% of all
derivative users holding swaps. 17% use swaptions and 14% use forward/futures contracts. Option
usage is limited to less than five percent of derivative users.
These findings are broadly consistent with the limited number of related prior studies. These stud-
ies indicate the most common exposure hedged through municipal derivatives is interest rate risk
with swaps being the most popular derivative instrument (Dotson et al., 1994; Stewart and Cox,
2008). Our analyses also highlight the rapid growth of municipal derivative market over the recent
years. For instance, Stewart and Cox (2008) report that in financial year 2003, only 23 of the 100 lar-
gest U.S. cities used derivatives. These derivative positions carried a total notional value of $10.6 bil-
lion. In comparison for the year 2008, our data covers 59 large U.S. cities and 34 of them use
derivatives. Further, the notional value of these derivative positions exceeds $27 billion.
The main objective of this study is to investigate the determinants of municipal sector derivative
usage in terms of both the decision to use derivatives and the extent of its usage. Despite the rapid
growth of the municipal derivatives market over the years and the numerous controversies surround-
ing it, currently, there are no systematic academic studies addressing this issue. In developing theories
1 In this paper, we use the term ‘‘municipalities” to denote both cities and counties.
2 On July 18 2013, Detroit filed for bankruptcy, making it the largest municipal bankruptcy in the U.S. history.
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regarding determinants of derivative usage by municipalities, we draw from the related literature in
the corporate sector while taking into account the important distinguishing features between munic-
ipalities and corporations.3 We carry out our analyses in two stages. First, using a probit regression, we
investigate the determinants of the decision to use derivatives. Next, we use an OLS regression and
examine the determinants of the extent of derivative usage.
Our main findings are as follows: We document that financially constrained municipalities are
more likely to use derivatives. Both the propensity to engage in derivative transactions and the extent
of derivative usage are positively associated with leverage and negatively associated with credit rat-
ing. Hence, it appears that benefits of derivatives are greater for financially constrained municipalities
because securing smoother cash flows is more valuable for them. Consistent with the large body of
corporate sector literature that suggests economies of scale in establishing a derivative program
(e.g., Nance et al., 1993; Mian, 1996; Geczy et al., 1997; Haushalter, 2000; Graham and Rogers,
2002), we find a strong positive association with municipality size and the decision to engage in
derivative activities as well as the extent of derivative usage. While corporate sector literature argues
that hedging is more useful for firms with higher growth opportunities (Froot et al., 1993), we do not
find a significant relationship between growth and derivative usage in the municipal sector.
Some argue that corporate sector use of derivatives is driven by managerial opportunism and lack
of governance (e.g., Kumar and Rabinovitch, 2013; Lobo et al., 2015; Stulz, 1984; Tufano, 1996, 1998).
This concern could be especially important in the municipal sector given the relative lack of monitor-
ing by citizens (Zimmerman, 1977) and recent anecdotal evidence of corrupt municipal officials
engaging in derivative activities for self-compensation in the form of gifts and payments from invest-
ment bankers (e.g., Braun, 2009). On the other hand, differences in risk appetite between managers
and shareholder observed in the corporate sector (where under-diversified managers are more risk
averse than well-diversified shareholders) are less prevalent in the municipality sector. Hence, man-
agerial opportunism in the municipal sector may not manifest in greater derivative usage. Consistent
with this latter argument, we do not find any large sample evidence to support the notion that man-
agerial opportunism is a significant factor in the decision to use municipal derivatives or the extent of
derivative usage. Interestingly, we find that large municipalities with high managerial sophistication
and smaller municipalities with low managerial sophistication are more likely to use derivatives. This
finding provides credence to concerns raised by regulators that smaller municipalities are susceptible
to entering into complex derivative contracts that they do not fully understand (Richardson, 2005).
We believe this paper is of interest to academics, practitioners, and regulatory agencies for at least
two reasons. First, we provide relatively recent large sample evidence on numerous aspects of deriva-
tive usage in the U.S. municipal sector such as the extent of usage, the type of exposures hedged with
derivatives, and the types of derivative instruments used. Second, we provide insights on the determi-
nants that influence the propensity to use derivatives as well as the extent of derivative usage in the U.
S. municipal sector. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to carry out a systematic
analysis of this nature with respect to the U.S. municipal sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant literature on derivatives
usage in the municipal and corporate sectors; Section 3 develops our hypotheses; Section 4 describes
the data and sample selection; Section 5 presents the research design; Section 6 presents the empirical
findings and Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1. Derivative usage in municipal entities
A derivative can be defined as a financial contract that derives its value from the performance of an
underlying asset (e.g., interest rates, exchange rates, stock prices, etc.). Most commonly used
3 For example, the notion of using derivatives to smooth cash flows and avoid costly bankruptcies (Smith and Stulz, 1985) can be
conceptually applied to the municipality sector as well. On the other hand, corporate derivative usage theories predicated on tax
incentives (Smith and Stulz, 1985) are irrelevant to tax-exempt entities such as municipalities.
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derivative instruments include swaps, options, forward/futures contracts, and swaptions. While the
derivative usage in the municipal sector has grown exponentially over the past few decades (GASB,
2008; Robbins, 2009), little empirical evidence exists on this subject.4,5 Moreover, there are no reliable
estimates on the municipal derivative market since these instruments are transacted privately rather
than in a public exchange.
According to Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) (2008), governmental entities may
find derivative transactions useful in reducing risk exposures (for example, reducing exposure to
interest rate risk by synthetically converting a floating rate debt obligation to a fixed rate obligation
via a pay-fixed, receive-variable swap), lowering borrowing costs (some entities argue that pay-
fixed, receive-variable swaps result in lower synthetic fixed interest rates than would be achieved
by issuing fixed rate debt directly), and managing cash flows (some municipal derivatives include
an up-front cash payment). However, imprudent use of derivative instruments could also expose
municipalities to significant risks. According to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s report
on the Municipal Securities Market (2012), these risks primarily stem frommunicipality officers’ unfa-
miliarity about complex derivative transactions and the various inherent conflicts of interest associ-
ated with these types of transactions. Many municipal entities rely upon and trust the financial
institutions that sell derivative products and do not solicit services of independent advisors. It has
been claimed that the potential for serious conflicts remain even when services of separate advisors
are sought, because advisor compensation is contingent upon completion of a transaction, they rely
on financial institutions (that sell derivatives) for referrals, and the relationship with the municipal
entities is typically limited to the duration of the transaction as opposed to the life of the derivative
product. Concerns have also been raised that many municipalities enter into transactions that they
do not fully understand and that tend to have excessive fees. Also suggested is that derivative dealers’
offers of up-front payments and other benefits as inducements potentially lead to transactions that are
both unnecessary and corrupt. The extent of these risks has been illustrated in high-profile derivative
debacles such as those involving Jefferson County, Alabama, and the City of Detroit.
As a part of its 1994 report on the U.S. derivatives industry, the United States General Accounting
Office (GAO)6 conducted a survey on the use of financial derivatives by state and local government enti-
ties that include municipalities, special districts, and counties.7 The GAO survey found derivative usage
to be rather sparse in the governmental sector with only four percent of 3400 total respondents reporting
the use of derivative instruments. In a similar survey conducted by the Government Finance Officers
Association (GFOA) and the Municipal Bond Investors Assurance Corporation (MBIA) in 1994, 44% out
of more than 1600 respondents indicated they would consider using derivatives, but only six percent
had actually done so (Dotson et al., 1994). Neither survey provides an indication as to the magnitude
of derivative usage among users.
To our knowledge, Stewart and Cox (2008) is the first attempt to investigate the extent of
municipal derivatives usage utilizing information contained in financial statements of municipal
governments. Analyzing fiscal year 2003 comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFR) of the 50
states and 100 largest cities in the U.S., Stewart and Cox (2008) finds that 23 state governments
and 23 municipal governments engaged in debt-related derivatives transactions. The aggregate
4 Abdel-khalik and Chen (2015) attribute some of the growth in overall derivative market to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999 and the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.
5 In theory, derivatives can be used for hedging or speculating purposes. Governmental entities are typically prohibited from
engaging in derivative transactions for speculative purposes. For example, in its advisory on the use of debt-related derivatives
products and the development of a derivatives policy, the Government Finance Officers Association states that, ‘‘(derivatives)
should not be used for speculation, but only to manage risks associated with an issuer’s assets or liabilities” (https://www.
sec.gov/comments/s7-25-11/s72511-39.pdf). As a practical matter, a derivative is considered a hedge (speculative transaction)
when the entity’s exposure to the underlying asset covered by the derivative is greater (smaller) than the product of derivative’s
notional value and delta. On this basis, all derivatives we have encountered in our analyses can be categorized as hedging
instruments.
6 Effective July 7, 2004 the GAO’s legal name was changed from the General Accounting Office to the Government Accountability
Office.
7 In June 1992, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy
and Commerce launched an investigation into financial derivatives markets. The GAO report titled, ‘‘Financial Derivatives: Actions
Needed to Protect the Financial System” was the outcome of the subcommittee’s request to report on the matter.
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notional value of the debt-related derivatives positions among the municipalities is reported to be just
over $10.5 billion. They also report that more than 90% of the debt-related derivatives instruments
used by states and municipalities are interest rate swaps. However, they do not make an attempt to
investigate the determinants of derivative usage at either the city or state level.
Overall, a very limited number of studies attempt to document the extent of derivative usage and
the type of derivative instruments used in the governmental sector at different points in time. Other
than reporting general descriptive information, none of these studies attempt to systematically
investigate the determinants of derivative usage in municipal entities. Our paper attempts to shed
light on this important issue.
2.2. Insights from corporate sector
In contrast to the governmental sector, a large body of literature exists on the rationale for deriva-
tive usage in the corporate sector. It suggests that firms may engage in derivative transactions for
either shareholder value enhancement or reasons of managerial opportunism. For example, Smith
and Stulz (1985) argue that smoothing of cash flows through derivatives can enhance shareholder
value when post-tax cash flows are a concave function of pre-tax cash flows due to progressive tax
rates. Nance et al. (1993) and Graham and Smith (1999) find empirical evidence consistent with this
argument. Smith and Stulz (1985) also present bankruptcy costs as a rationale for engaging in hedging
activities. Consistent with this view, a number of empirical studies document a positive association
between derivative usage and firm leverage (e.g., Nance et al., 1993; Tufano, 1996; Haushalter,
2000). Froot et al. (1993) analytically demonstrate that hedging creates shareholder value by alleviat-
ing underinvestment problems created by costly external financing. In contrast, the literature also
suggests that corporate managers may engage in opportunistic derivative hedging caused by man-
ager–shareholder conflicts of interest and/or divergences in risk appetite between the two parties
(e.g., Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996; Knopf et al., 2002; Kumar and Rabinovitch,
2013). The corporate sector literature also documents a strong association between firm size and
the extent of derivative usage, suggesting the presence of economies of scale (Nance et al., 1993;
Mian, 1996).
It should be noted however, that there are important differences between corporations and munic-
ipal entities. First, while the corporate sector has the clearly defined goal of maximizing shareholder
value, the success of which can be measured through market prices, objectives of municipalities are
invariably broader and more difficult to measure. Second, while much of the theory on the corporate
sector derivative usage is based on the premise of well diversified shareholders with utility functions
that are risk neutral with respect to wealth, such assumptions are unlikely to hold with respect to cit-
izens and their consumption of municipal services. Third, corporations and municipalities are funda-
mentally different in their institutional setup (corporate taxation, governance structures, etc.). For
instance, agency problems are argued to be more severe in municipalities because the level of mon-
itoring from citizens is not very strong (Zimmerman, 1977). Fourth, the corporate and municipal
derivative markets are unlikely to be comparable in terms of market development and product
offerings.
Therefore, even though the literature on corporate derivatives could be useful in generating some
insights on the municipality sector, its findings cannot be directly applied to municipal entities with-
out further study. For example, the difficulty in clearly defining goals and objectives along with the
absence of a ‘‘well diversified investor” makes it harder to distinguish between managerial oppor-
tunism and value creation objectives of derivative usage in the municipal sector. For instance, while
a number of corporate sector studies contend that risk reduction through hedging is appealing to
the less diversified manager, but should not create value to well diversified shareholders, one could
argue that hedging is value enhancing in the municipal sector because unlike investment portfolios
of investors, residence location of municipal residents cannot be diversified away. So, whereas the
above argument suggests a positive association between hedging and agency conflicts in the corporate
sector, it does not lead to such a prediction for municipalities. In terms of differences in institutional
setup, tax convexity based arguments of derivative usage (Smith and Stulz, 1985) are clearly not
applicable for municipalities. Moreover, it could be argued that compared to the corporate sector,
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municipalities exhibit more governance problems and are likely to employ less sophisticated man-
agers (Richardson, 2005). If so, derivative usage in the municipal sector will be exposed to more abu-
sive practices either at hands of opportunistic managers or aggressive derivative salesmen. Still, some
arguments presented in the corporate sector literature on derivative usage would apply to municipal
sector as well. One example is the need to reduce cash flow volatility in the face of financial
constraints.
3. Hypothesis development
In the absence of prior literature that provides a theoretical framework for the use of derivatives by
municipalities, in investigating this issue, we draw from the corporate sector literature as well as pop-
ular press that discuss issues pertaining to municipal derivative usage.
3.1. Financial constraints hypothesis
Hedging reduces cash flow volatility. To see this, consider a pay-fixed, receive-variable interest rate
swap – the most common type of derivatives used by municipalities. Municipalities typically issue
floating rate debt. Hence, their interest payments are sensitive to the movements of the underlying
index on which the floating rate is based. Pay-fixed, receive-variable interest rate swaps attempt to
synthetically convert floating rate debt into fixed rate so that future interest obligations are known
with a greater degree of certainty. Reduced volatility of future cash outlays is potentially more valu-
able to financially constrained entities as even moderately unfavorable fluctuations in cash flows can
have severe repercussions for these entities. Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that financially
constrained municipalities are more likely to use derivatives. In a similar vein, Smith and Stulz
(1985) argue that corporations value derivatives because hedging can reduce the probability of bank-
ruptcy and hence, the associated deadweight costs. Haushalter (2000) finds that among oil and gas
producers, firms with higher financial leverage tend to use more derivatives. Tufano (1996) finds sim-
ilar evidence for the gold mining industry. Therefore, we state our first hypothesis as follows:
H1 (Financial constraints hypothesis). There is a positive relation between financial constraints and
municipal derivative usage.
3.2. Growth hypothesis
In the corporate sector literature, Froot et al. (1993) argue that derivative usage can alleviate
underinvestment problems faced by firms due to frictions in capital markets. Firms with growth
opportunities may reduce the level of investment from first-best level in order to economize dead-
weight costs of external financing. Smoother cash flows facilitated by derivative instruments can
reduce the need to access external capital markets and hence ease underinvestment problems. Some
empirical studies in the corporate sector report findings that are consistent with this notion. For exam-
ple, Minton and Schrand (1999) analyze a broad array of firms over the period 1989–1995 and find
that higher cash flow volatility is associated with lower levels of capital expenditures. Geczy et al.
(1997) investigate the currency derivatives usage of 372 Fortune 500 firms and find that firms with
greater growth opportunities are more likely to use derivative instruments.
This line of reasoning can be extended to municipalities in the sense that municipalities that antic-
ipate growing demand for their services would be keener on maintaining smooth cash flows. To the
extent that Froot et al.’s (1993) theory is descriptive of derivative usage in the municipal sector we
would expect a positive association between growth and derivative usage of municipalities. We for-
mally state this hypothesis as follows:
H2 (Growth hypothesis). There is a positive relation between growth and municipal derivative usage.
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One could argue however, that aforementioned constraints in accessing capital markets are not
severely binding in the municipal sector because unlike corporations, cities and counties can impose
taxes on their residents. To the extent that growth needs of municipalities can be relatively easily met
via tax increases, the theory of Froot et al. (1993) will be less applicable to municipalities. In that case,
we are less likely to observe an association between growth and municipal derivative usage.
3.3. Size hypothesis
Setting up and maintaining a derivative program is costly as it involves transaction costs, personnel
costs, systems and software costs, etc. (Brown, 2001). Extant corporate sector research finds a strong
and consistent association between derivative usage and firm size, indicating that only relatively large
entities are in a position to maintain a derivative program (e.g., Nance et al., 1993; Mian, 1996; Geczy
et al., 1997; Haushalter, 2000; Graham and Rogers, 2002). In the municipal sector, the 1994 GAO sur-
vey indicates that users of derivatives tend to have greater assets than non-users. Therefore, as our
next hypothesis, we conjecture a positive relationship between municipality size and derivative usage.
H3 (Size hypothesis). There is a positive relation between municipality size and derivative usage.
3.4. Managerial opportunism hypothesis
A concern raised in the popular press is that municipal managers tend to use derivatives not
because of the benefits they accrue to municipalities, but due to opportunistic reasons. As derivative
contracts generate large commissions for investment banks, there is concern that these bankers
unduly influence city officials into initiating municipal derivative programs through various forms
of kickbacks. For instance, former Jefferson County Commission president, Larry Langford, was
indicted in December 2008 for taking bribes of $235,000 from an investment banker relating to the
issuance of $5.4 billion worth of sewer bonds and swap contracts (Prada and Karmin, 2008). Subse-
quently, the swap contracts went sour, forcing Jefferson County to file for bankruptcy. Larry Langford
was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years in prison.
In the corporate sector literature, Kumar and Rabinovitch (2013) find that derivative usage is pos-
itively associated with managerial entrenchment. Lobo et al. (2015) find that managers use derivatives
for opportunistic overinvestment. If derivative usage in the municipal sector is driven by managerial
opportunism, greater derivative usage would be observed in municipalities where managerial agency
conflicts are higher. Hence our fourth hypothesis is as follows:
H4 (Managerial opportunism hypothesis). There is a positive relation between managerial oppor-
tunism and municipal derivative usage.
However, there are countervailing factors as well. As previously discussed in Section 2.2 and
despite anecdotal evidence on managerial opportunism inducing derivative activities in the municipal
sector, it has to be noted that both the city officials (agent) and the residents (principal) can be thought
of as undiversified and risk averse with respect to municipality outcomes. This contrasts with the cor-
porate sector setting where undiversified managers have stronger incentives to engage in hedging
activities than well diversified investors. Accordingly, unlike the corporate setting, there could be
greater incentive alignment with respect to engaging in derivative activities in the municipal sector.
Hence, both opportunistic as well as benevolent managers could be drawn to derivatives in the munic-
ipal sector, making it difficult to find empirical results consistent with hypothesis H4.
3.5. Managerial sophistication hypothesis
Another argument commonly made in the popular press is that financially sophisticated invest-
ment bankers, who are attracted by the potential of lucrative commissions, lure relatively unsophis-
ticated city officials into complex derivative transactions that the latter do not completely understand
(e.g., Richardson, 2005; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s report on the Municipal Securities
Market, 2012).
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For instance, one of the most common reasons cited by municipalities for using a pay-fixed,
receive-variable interest rate swap contracts is that synthetically creating fixed rate debt through
derivatives enables municipalities to secure lower interest rates when compared to issuing standard
fixed rate debt (Dodd, 2010). Stewart and Cox (2008) provide an illustration where the state of North
Carolina, in the context of its 2002 general obligation bond issuances, argues that swap contracts
enabled it to lock in synthetic fixed interest rates of 3.283% and 3.089%, whereas standard fixed rate
general obligation bonds carry an interest rate of 4.452%.
However, closer observation of these derivative contracts indicates that claims of such massive
arbitrage opportunities are rather exaggerated for at least three reasons. First, floating rate munic-
ipal debt is typically linked to the SIFMA index, but many swap agreements are linked to LIBOR.
Hence, synthetic fixed rate debt created through swaps expose municipalities to basis risk arising
through potential mismatching of SIFMA and LIBOR rates (Chu et al., 2008).8 Second, a typical swap
agreement allows the investment bank to prematurely terminate the swap in the face of adverse
events such as downgrading of the bond or cross default on other obligations of the municipality. If
the municipality is ‘‘out of the money” on the swap when termination events take place, the termina-
tion can result in substantial unanticipated payment obligations (Chu et al., 2008). According to Bloom-
berg News, during the period of 2008–2010, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America
collected more than $4 billion on terminations fees related to derivatives transactions with municipal
entities (McDonald, 2010).
Third, derivative programs entail significant costs both in terms of set up costs and investment
banking fees.9 None of the aforementioned risks and costs would be present in the case of municipalities
directly issuing fixed rate debt. It is unclear to what extent municipal officials are aware of these intri-
cacies as they initiate derivative programs.
Due to concerns that city officials enter into derivative transactions without completely under-
standing the complexities of these transactions, the state of Tennessee in 2009 enacted regula-
tions requiring cities and counties wanting to enter into derivative transactions to hire
qualified employees, such as a finance chief or accountant, who understand those complex agree-
ments (Nolan, 2010). If municipal derivative usage is symptomatic of a lack of financial sophis-
tication on the part of municipal officials, then we should observe the derivative usage to be
less prevalent in municipalities with higher managerial sophistication. Therefore, our final
hypothesis is as follows:
H5 (Managerial sophistication hypothesis). There is a negative relation between managerial sophisti-
cation and municipal derivative usage.
However, a counter argument is that municipalities with greater levels of financial sophistication
are more likely to engage in derivatives activities because they better understand these complex
transactions. Municipalities with unsophisticated officials may stay away from derivatives due to fear
of the unknown. In that case, the relation between managerial sophistication and municipal derivative
usage would be positive.
4. Data and sample selection
We gather our data from the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) of U.S. cities and
counties over the four year period of 2005–2008. Our analyses are unlikely to be affected by the
disruptions to the derivative markets during the financial crisis as our sample periods ends in
2008.10 Due to extensive hand collection efforts involved, we restrict our analyses to cities with
8 One potential source of basis risk is the risk that the spread between taxable and tax-exempt rates will be less than anticipated
due to reductions in marginal tax rate. This facet of basis risk is known as tax risk.
9 For instance, in the case of Jefferson County, the investment banker who bribed the County Commission president is alleged to
have received more than $7 million in fees (Prada and Karmin, 2008).
10 Triggering the global financial crisis, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection on September 15, 2008. In our sample we
do not observe significant disruptions to municipal derivative activities in 2008. Municipalities most likely felt the impact of the
crisis in subsequent years.
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populations of over 250,000 and counties with populations of over 1,000,000 (2008 census). Our final
analysis is limited to 61 cities and 25 counties because not all municipalities make their CAFRs
available online. This covers 81% (63%) of cities (counties) that meet the aforementioned population
threshold. In terms of population, our sample represents around 49 million city residents and
56 million county residents annually. The final sample consists of 337 municipality-year observations
(239 city-year observations and 98 county-year observations). Focus on relatively larger
entities is appropriate for this study as they are the most likely candidates to use derivative
instruments (GAO survey, 1994). However, focusing on larger entities potentially diminish the power
of our size hypothesis (H3) tests.
We collect the city and county CAFRs from the website of each entity and carefully review them for
disclosures on derivative usage. Municipalities provide detailed disclosures on their derivative usage
in notes to the financial statements. If the municipality engages in derivative transactions, we gather
relevant details such as the type of instruments, the underlying risks that have been hedged, and the
notional value. When the municipality does not make any derivatives related disclosures or explicitly
states that they do not use derivatives, we label them as non-users. All other variables used in our
analyses are gathered from CAFRs as well. Financial variables relate to total municipality-wide
amounts.
Panel A (B) of Table 1 provides the list of cities (counties) used in our analysis along with their
respective populations (2008 census) and the number of observations for each city (county).
Given the lack of large sample evidence on the use of municipal derivative instruments in
recent times, we present a number of figures summarizing the general trends of derivative usage
during our sample period. Fig. 1 reports the time trend of derivative users over the period of
2005–2008. The percentage of cities that use derivatives remains constant at 58%. However,
there is an increase in the propensity to use derivatives by counties from 42% in 2005 to 50%
in 2008.
Fig. 2 reports the time trend in terms of the aggregate notional value of derivative positions held.
While the proportion of municipal derivative users has remained rather steady over the period,
Fig. 2 indicates a clear upward trend in terms of the extent of derivative usage. The aggregate
notional value of derivative positions for the full sample went up from $22.5 billion to $31.2 billion
over the sample period, representing a 39% increase. Total notional value of derivative instruments
for cities (counties) went up from $20.1 ($2.4) billion to $27.1 ($3.5) billion, representing a growth
of 35 (47)%. These figures provide evidence of the rapid growth of municipal derivatives market
over the recent years. As a reference, Stewart and Cox (2008) report the total notional value of
derivatives held by the 100 largest U.S. cities in financial year 2003 to be $10.6 billion. In
comparison, among the 61 cities investigated in our sample, the 2008 total notional value is as high
as $27 billion.
Fig. 3 indicates the underlying risks that are managed through derivative instruments. 92% of
derivative users (95% of city derivative users and 82% of county derivative users) employ interest
rate derivatives. Eleven percent of derivative users (seven percent of city derivative users and 22%
of county derivative users) employ exchange rate derivatives. Only three percent of derivative users
(four percent of city derivative users and zero percent of county derivative users) hold derivatives
linked to commodities. Untabulated analyses indicate that interest rate instruments overwhelmingly
dominate the total derivative portfolios in terms of notional value as well. Interest rate instruments
account for 98.2% of notional value of all derivatives held (98.7% for cities and 94.7% for counties).
Therefore, we define in all of our subsequent analysis the propensity and the extent of derivative
usage in terms of interest rate derivatives. Using the broader definition does not alter any of our
inferences.
Fig. 4 reports the composition of interest rate derivatives in terms of type. 83% of municipalities
(86% of cities and 73% of counties) that use interest rate derivatives hold swap contracts. Less than
20% hold swaptions and forward/futures contracts. The usage of option contracts is limited to less than
10% of interest rate derivative users.
Next, we discuss the research design with respect to our analyses on the determinants of derivative
usage.
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Table 1
The sample.
City name State # of obs. Population (2008)
Panel A: Cities
City of New York NY 4 8,363,710
Los Angeles CA 4 3,833,995
Chicago IL 4 2,853,114
Houston TX 4 2,242,193
Phoenix AZ 4 1,567,924
Philadelphia PA 4 1,447,395
San Antonio TX 4 1,351,305
City of Dallas TX 4 1,279,910
San Diego CA 4 1,279,329
Detroit MI 4 912,062
San Francisco CA 4 808,976
Jacksonville FL 4 807,815
Indianapolis IN 4 798,382
City of Austin TX 4 757,688
City of Columbus OH 4 754,885
Fort Worth TX 4 703,073
Charlotte NC 4 687,456
Memphis city TN 4 669,651
Baltimore MD 4 636,919
El Paso TX 4 613,190
Boston MA 4 609,023
Denver CO 4 598,707
Nashville-Davidson Metropolitan Government TN 4 596,462
Washington D.C. DC 4 591,833
Las Vegas NV 3 558,383
Portland OR 4 557,706
Louisville-Jefferson Metropolitan Government KY 4 557,224
Oklahoma City OK 4 551,789
Tucson AZ 4 541,811
Atlanta GA 5 537,958
Albuquerque NM 4 521,999
Fresno CA 4 476,050
Sacramento City CA 4 463,794
Mesa City AZ 4 463,552
Kansas City MO 4 451,572
Omaha NE 4 438,646
Cleveland OH 5 433,748
Miami FL 4 413,201
Raleigh NC 4 392,552
Minneapolis MN 4 382,605
Colorado Springs CO 4 380,307
Arlington TX 4 374,417
Wichita KS 4 366,046
St. Louis MO 3 354,361
City of Tampa FL 4 340,882
Santa Ana CA 3 339,130
City of Cincinnati OH 4 333,336
Aurora CO 4 319,057
Pittsburgh PA 4 310,037
Riverside CA 4 295,357
Stockton City CA 4 287,037
Corpus Christi TX 4 286,462
Lexington-Fayette KY 3 282,114
St. Paul MN 4 279,590
City of Buffalo NY 4 270,919
Plano City TX 4 267,480
Henderson City NV 4 252,064
Lincoln City NE 4 251,624
Fort Wayne IN 1 251,591
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5. Research design
We employ the following regression specifications to investigate our hypotheses. (Municipality
and year subscripts are suppressed for ease of exposition)11:
ProbðDeriv ¼ 1Þ
¼ a1Leverageþ a2CreditRating þ a3PopGrowthþ a4LnAsset þ aSManagerRun
þ a6GFOAþ a7Countyþ ajYear þ akRegionþ E ð1Þ
DerivNV ¼ ao þ a1Leverageþ a2CreditRating þ a3PopGrowthþ a4LnAsset þ aSManagerRun
þ a6GFOAþ a7Countyþ ajYear þ akRegionþ E ð2Þ
11 The coefficients reported in the probit regression are the marginal effects, measuring the change in the expected value of the
dependent variable as one independent variable increases by unity while all other variables are kept constant. Therefore, the
intercept is omitted.
Table 1 (continued)
City name State # of obs. Population (2008)
Glendale AZ 4 251,522
City of Greensboro NC 4 250,642
Total 239 48,851,562
County name State # of obs. Population (2008)
Panel B: Counties
Los Angeles County CA 4 9,862,049
Cook County IL 5 5,294,664
Harris County TX 4 3,984,349
Maricopa County AZ 4 3,954,598
Orange County CA 4 3,010,759
Dallas County TX 4 2,412,827
Miami-Dade County FL 4 2,398,245
Riverside County CA 4 2,100,516
Wayne County MI 4 1,949,929
Clark County NV 4 1,865,746
Broward County FL 4 1,751,234
Tarrant County TX 4 1,750,091
Bexar County TX 4 1,622,899
Suffolk County NY 4 1,512,224
Alameda County CA 4 1,474,368
Sacramento County CA 4 1,394,154
Palm Beach County FL 4 1,265,293
Allegheny County PA 4 1,215,103
Oakland County MI 4 1,202,174
Hillsborough County FL 1 1,180,784
Hennepin County MN 4 1,140,988
Franklin County OH 4 1,129,067
Contra Costa County CA 4 1,029,703
Salt Lake County UT 4 1,022,651
Honolulu County HI 4 905,034
Total 98 56,429,449
This table indicates the sample of the study. Panel A (B) provides the list of cities (counties) used in our analysis along with their
respective populations (2008 census) and the number of observations for each city (county). Municipalities are in the
descending order of population.
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As our hypotheses attempt to identify factors that drive derivative usage of municipalities, we
investigate these factors in terms of their relation with both (i) propensity to use derivatives and
(ii) extent of derivative usage.
Model (1) is a probit model where Deriv is a binary variable taking the value of one if the munic-
ipality uses derivative instruments and zero otherwise. Model (2) is an OLS specification where the
dependent variable measures the extent of derivative usage. Specifically, DerivNV is defined as the
notional value of derivative positions in a municipality in a given year (in $ millions). Only
derivative-user municipalities are included when running Model (2) regression.
Hypothesis H1 predicts a positive relation between derivative usage and financial constraints. To
test this supposition, we employ two measures of financial constraints; (i) Financial Leverage (Lever-
age) and (ii) Credit rating (CreditRating). We measure Leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to total
assets. The variable CreditRating represents the credit rating of the municipality’s general obligation
bonds. CreditRating takes values from zero to nine with higher values representing better credit
quality.12 Hypothesis H1 predicts a positive coefficient on Leverage (a1) and a negative coefficient on
CreditRating (a2).
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Fig. 1. Time trend of derivative users: 2005–2008. The figure indicates the percentage of derivative users in our sample over the
period of 2005–2008. The three blocks of each year separately show the percentage of derivative users out of the combined
sample, cities, and counties.
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Fig. 2. Time trend of the aggregate notional value of derivative positions held. The figure indicates the time trend of the
aggregate notional value of derivative instruments held by municipalities over the period of 2005–2008. The instruments
include interest rate, foreign exchange rate, as well as commodity price derivatives. The three blocks of each year separately
show the aggregate notional values for the combined sample, cities, and counties. Amounts are in millions of dollars.
12 Specifically, using S&P terminology following numeric values are assigned for each rating category: AAA = 9, AA = 8, A = 7,
BBB = 6, BB = 5, B = 4, CCC = 3, CC = 2, C = 1, D = 0.
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Hypothesis H2 examines whether there is a relation between growth and municipal derivative
usage. We measure growth in terms of annual population growth from year t  1 to t (PopGrowth).
We use this measure because population growth potentially captures the intrinsic growth in demand
for services provided by a municipality. In contrast, financial measures of growth (e.g., asset growth)
are influenced not only by the demand side, but also by the municipalities’ ability to fulfill the
demand.13 If faster growing municipalities are more likely to use derivatives, we would expect the
coefficient on PopGrowth (a3) to be positive and significant.
In hypothesis H3, we argue that economies of scale lead to a positive association between
municipality size and derivative usage. We measure size in terms of the log value of total assets
(LnAsset). Size hypothesis (H3) predicts the coefficient on LnAsset (a4) to be positive.
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f D
er
iv
at
iv
e 
U
se
rs
100%
92%
95% 
80%
82% 
70% 
60%
50%
40%
Combined
Cities
Counties 
20%
10%
11%
7%
22%
3%  4% 
0% 
Interest Rate
Derivative 
Exchange Rate
Derivative 
Commodity Price
Derivative 
Fig. 3. Derivative types based on risks managed. The figure indicates the types of derivatives used based on the underlying risk
that is managed. The three blocks of each instrument separately show the percentage of derivative instruments users for
combined sample, cities, and counties.
%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
In
te
re
st
R
at
e
D
er
iv
at
iv
e
U
se
rs 100%
90%
80%
70%
86% 
83% 
73% 
60%
50%
40%
Combined
Cities
Counties 
30%
20%
10%
0%
20% 
17% 
7%
14%13  16% 
5% 7% 
0% 
Swaps Swaptions Forward/Futures Options 
Fig. 4. Types of interest rate derivatives. The figure indicates the composition of interest rate derivative instruments in terms of
swaps, swaptions, forward/futures, and options. The three blocks of each instrument separately show the percentage of
derivative instruments users for combined sample, cities, and counties.
13 However, in robustness tests we investigate the sensitivity of our inferences to alternative measures of growth. We discuss
these in Section 6.3.1.
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Hypothesis H4 investigates the relation between managerial opportunism and derivative usage.
Opportunistic behavior by managers is likely more rampant when there are more severe agency
problems and the governance mechanisms are ineffective. Zimmerman (1977) argues that agency
problems in appointed manager-run municipalities are likely less severe vis-à-vis elected mayor-
run cities because the city council has stronger incentives to monitor the manager. Consistent with
this notion, Giroux and McLelland (2003) find manager-run cities to outperform their mayor-run
counterparts along several dimensions. Hence, we measure managerial opportunism based on
whether the entity is manager-run or mayor-run. The dummy variable ManagerRun takes the value
of one if the city/county has an appointed manager and zero otherwise. Managerial opportunism
hypothesis (H4) predicts a negative coefficient on the variableManagerRun (a5). However, if incentives
of municipal officials and residents are aligned with respect to derivative usage, we are unlikely to find
a significant coefficient on ManagerRun (a5).
If less sophisticated managers are lured into derivative agreements by opportunistic investment
bankers as predicted in hypothesis H5, we would expect a negative relation between managerial
sophistication and derivative usage. We capture managerial sophistication based on whether the
municipality is a recipient of the GFOA’s Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in Financial Report-
ing. This certification program was established in 1945 to promote transparent financial reporting in
state and local governments.14 Municipalities appear to highly value the GFOA certification and promi-
nently highlight it in their annual financial reports. Evans and Patton (1983) find that municipalities with
professionally active officials are more likely to participate in the GFOA certification program, suggesting
that municipalities with higher managerial sophistication are more likely to obtain this certification. The
binary variable GFOA takes the value of one if the entity has been awarded the GFOA certification and
zero otherwise.
Hypothesis H5 predicts a negative coefficient on GFOA (a6). However, if the counterargument that
sophisticated managers engage in derivative transactions while those who are less sophisticated stay
away due to fear of the unknown is true, then the coefficient on GFOA (a6) would be positive.
To identify any potential differences between cities and counties, we incorporate the dummy vari-
able County. County is set to one for counties and zero for cities. We do not make any predictions with
respect to the sign of the coefficient on County (a7). To mitigate any regional trends, we incorporate
region fixed effects based on the U.S. Census Bureau classification of regions and divisions. In order
to remove broader time trends, both Models (1) and (2) also include year fixed effects.
6. Empirical findings
6.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analyses
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. In Panel A of Table 2 we report descriptive
statistics for the combined sample of cities and counties. Separate information for cities and counties
are reported in Panels B and C of Table 2 respectively. In each panel, descriptive statistics for the full
sample as well as sub-samples of derivative users and non-users are reported separately. We also indi-
cate whether the variable means are statistically different between derivative users and non-users. For
the sake of brevity we only discuss Panel A of Table 2 (combined sample of cities and counties).
As seen in Panel A of Table 2, 55% ofmunicipalities in the sample use derivative contracts (Derivative
User) and the average notional value of derivative positions (Derivative NV) among the users is
$574.33 million. Lending support to the size hypothesis, the derivative users are larger in terms of total
assets (Total Assets), general revenues (General Revenues), and total population (Population). The average
leverage (Leverage) is 55% and the mean credit rating (Credit Rating) value of 8.12 suggests an AA rating
for the average municipality. Consistent with the financial constraints hypothesis, Leverage is higher
and Credit Rating is lower for derivative users when compared with non-users. The mean population
growth rate (Population Growth) is 1.22%. Contrary to predictions of the growth hypothesis, Population
Growth is lower for derivative users in comparison to non-users (1.1% versus 1.4%). 56% of the sample
14 See, http://www.gfoa.org/index.php?Itemid=58&id=35&option=com_content&task=view for details.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Combined sample Derivative users Non-users
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10))
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. t-stat for (4) > (7)
Panel A: Descriptive statistics – cities and counties combined
Derivative User 0.546 1.000 0.499 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Derivative NV 313,581 0 745,303 574,330 200,188 932,371 0 0 0 7.62***
Derivative FV 8488.80 0 72984.31 15547.41 3080.85 98335.38 0 0 0 2.14**
Total Assets 6,561,074 3,552,100 8,773,046 9,182,503 5,430,511 10,881,392 3,408,507 2,606,740 3,043,093 6.36***
General Revenues 1,231,670 543,012 2,436,101 1,750,045 997,605 3,181,087 618,429 425,668 565,254 4.34***
Population 1,231,632 686,850 1,593,294 1,527,203 774,946 1,981,391 876,174 568,380 807,516 3.81***
Leverage 0.549 0.473 0.357 0.643 0.564 0.439 0.437 0.431 0.164 5.48***
Credit Rating 8.116 8.000 0.745 7.903 8.000 0.801 8.372 8.000 0.578 6.04***
Population Growth 0.012 0.010 0.015 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.013 2.06**
Manager Run 0.558 1.000 0.497 0.473 0.000 0.501 0.660 1.000 0.475 3.52***
GFOA 0.902 1.000 0.298 0.940 1.000 0.238 0.855 1.000 0.353 2.62***
County 0.291 0.000 0.455 0.245 0.000 0.431 0.346 0.000 0.477 2.06**
Panel B: Descriptive statistics – cities
Derivative User 0.582 1.000 0.494 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Derivative NV 388,385 0 853,606 667,800 316,085 1,033,780 0 0 0 7.62***
Derivative FV 11948.85 0 66359.35 20545.15 3900.00 86120.03 0 0 0 2.81***
Total Assets 6,795,294 3,494,088 9,585,168 9,478,658 5,618,064 11,787,871 3,065,418 2,612,254 1,736,877 6.32***
General Revenues 1,202,898 456,375 2,798,324 1,747,798 727,631 3,577,552 461,834 334,513 414,980 4.15***
Population 814,267 484,730 1,166,117 1,068,884 618,435 1,467,087 460,350 387,841 226,497 4.81***
Leverage 0.559 0.469 0.396 0.661 0.572 0.480 0.417 0.415 0.143 5.66***
Credit Rating 8.050 8.000 0.760 7.923 8.000 0.869 8.225 8.000 0.533 3.32***
Population Growth 0.012 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.013 1.27
Manager Run 0.477 0.000 0.501 0.360 0.000 0.482 0.640 1.000 0.482 4.43***
GFOA 0.916 1.000 0.278 0.942 1.000 0.234 0.879 1.000 0.328 1.65
Panel C: Descriptive statistics – counties
Derivative User 0.459 0.000 0.501 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Derivative NV 131,148 0 298,171 285,612 134,555 388,430 0 0 0 4.93***
Derivative FV 50.493 0 86863.27 109.962 75.273 128972.05 0 0 0 0.01
Total Assets 5,989,866 3,636,902 6,380,744 8,267,715 5,131,983 7,450,705 4,055,843 2,374,797 4,546,649 3.31***
General Revenues 1,300,959 1,035,428 1,181,282 1,756,836 1,336,705 1,458,718 913,894 560,668 685,538 3.56***
Population 2,249,490 1,563,500 1,995,256 2,942,897 1,939,814 2,619,994 1,660,749 1,294,654 921,142 3.12***
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued)
Combined sample Derivative users Non-users
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10))
Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. Mean Median S.D. t-stat for (4) > (7)
Leverage 0.525 0.481 0.239 0.585 0.547 0.274 0.475 0.449 0.194 2.26**
Credit Rating 8.277 8.000 0.685 7.841 8.000 0.546 8.648 9.000 0.564 7.18***
Population Growth 0.012 0.011 0.015 0.009 0.008 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.014 1.96*
Manager Run 0.755 1.000 0.432 0.822 1.000 0.387 0.698 1.000 0.463 1.45
GFOA 0.867 1.000 0.341 0.933 1.000 0.252 0.811 1.000 0.395 1.85*
This table presents the descriptive statistics. In Panel A of this table, we report the descriptive statistics for the combined sample of cities and counties. Separate information for each group
is reported in Panels B and C of this table. Columns 1, 2, and 3 of each Panel present the descriptive statistics for the combined group of derivative users and non-users while Columns 4, 5, 6
(7, 8, 9) present these separately for derivative users (non-users). Column 10 indicates whether the variable means are statistically different between derivative users and non-users.
Variable definitions: Derivative User is a binary variable taking the value of one if the municipality uses at least one of the three types of derivative instruments (interest rate, foreign
exchange rate, and commodity derivative) in a certain year and zero otherwise. Derivative NV is the notional value of interest rate, foreign exchange rate, and commodity derivative
instruments. Derivative FV is the fair value of interest rate, foreign exchange rate, and commodity derivative instruments. Total Assets is the total assets of a municipality at the current year.
General Revenues is the general revenue of a municipality at the current year. Population is the population size of a municipality at the current year. Leverage is the ratio of total liability to
total assets. Credit Rating is sum of a municipality’s General Obligation Bond Ratings from S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch. Each rating is assigned a maximum value of 3, so credit rating has a
maximum value of 9, with higher values representing better credit quality. Population Growth is the ratio of population growth from last year to the current year to last year’s population.
Manager Run is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the form of government in a municipality is Council-manager or Council-elected executive, and zero otherwise. GFOA is a dummy
variable which equals 1 if a municipality receives the GFOA Certificate for Excellence in Financial Reporting at the current year and zero otherwise. County is a dummy variable taking the
value of one if the municipality is a county and zero if it is a city. All financial variables are in thousands of dollars. All numbers are scaled to nearest full number and all the ratios are
rounded to three decimal places.
* Significance at the 10% level (two-tailed).
** Significance at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Significance at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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consists of manager-run municipalities (Manager-Run). In line with the managerial opportunism
hypothesis, derivative user municipalities are relatively less likely to be run by appointed managers.
More than 90% of the observations have been awarded GFOA certification (GFOA), but the proportion
is higher for derivative users. In contrast with managerial sophistication hypothesis, this indicates that
municipalities with sophisticated managers are more likely to engage in derivative transactions.
Univariate tests of differences also indicate that counties are less likely to employ derivative contracts.
We report the correlation matrix of our variables in Table 3. Bold-faced numbers in Table 3 indicate
correlation coefficients that are statistically significant at 10% level or better. Inferences from Table 3
are quite similar to those from the tests of mean differences reported in Table 2. Providing preliminary
evidence consistent with the financial constraints hypothesis, we observe that propensity to use
derivatives (Derivative User) is positively associated with Leverage and negatively associated with
Credit Rating. Derivative User is negatively associated with population growth (PopGrowth), a result
inconsistent with the growth hypothesis. In line with the size hypothesis, we observe a significant
positive relation between Derivative User and LnAsset. The negative relation between Derivative User
and ManagerRun is consistent with the managerial opportunism hypothesis. The positive correlation
of Derivative User with GFOA suggests that sophisticated entities are more likely to use derivatives.
We also observe a negative correlation between Derivative User and County, indicating that cities
are more likely to use derivatives when compared with counties. All the aforementioned relations
hold when we replaced Derivative User with the notional value of derivative holdings (Derivative NV).
While tests of mean differences and univariate correlations provide some insights on the derivative
usage of municipalities, we cannot make strong inferences due to cross-correlations among variables.
Therefore, we turn to multivariate analyses to more rigorously investigate our hypotheses.
6.2. Main results
6.2.1. Analyses on the propensity to use derivatives
Table 4 reports results for the probit model [Model (1)] where we investigate the factors that
explain municipalities’ propensity to use derivatives. Model (1) explains the propensity to use
derivatives by municipalities quite well with a pseudo R-squared of over 50%.
The coefficient on Leverage is positive and highly significant (a1 = 1.065, p-value < 0.001) indicating
that highly leveraged municipalities are more likely to engage in derivative transactions. Moreover,
we observe a strong negative relation between credit rating and the propensity to use derivatives
as evident from the negative coefficient on CreditRating (a2 = 0.198, p-value < 0.001). Together, these
results strongly support hypothesis H1 that financially constrained municipalities are more likely to
use derivative contracts.
The coefficient on Popgrowth is statistically insignificant (a3 = 1.393, p-value = 0.520). Hence, we
do not find evidence supportive of hypothesis H2 that municipalities with greater growth prospects
are more likely to use derivatives. Perhaps maintaining smooth cash flows to facilitate future
investment needs is not a major concern for municipalities due to their ability to raise tax revenue.
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Derivative User 0.80 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.17 0.42 0.19 0.14 0.11
(2) Derivative NV 0.38 0.42 0.32 0.24 0.12 0.52 0.28 0.10 0.14
(3) Derivative FV 0.11 0.35 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.10
(4) Leverage 0.29 0.47 0.13 0.21 0.28 0.15 0.37 0.10 0.02
(5) Credit Rating 0.31 0.28 0.11 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.15 0.05 0.12
(6) PopGrowth 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.23 0.24 0.01 0.25 0.03 0
(7) LnAsset 0.33 0.70 0.18 0.36 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.06
(8) ManagerRun 0.19 0.33 0.22 0.30 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.05 0.25
(9) GFOA 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07
(10) County 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.14 0 0.05 0.25 0.07
This table presents the correlation coefficients of main variables in the test. Pearson correlation is below diagonal and Spearman
correlation is above diagonal. Correlations significant at 10% level or better are bold-faced.
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Consistent with insights from the corporate sector literature, we observe a strong positive
correlation with size and the likelihood of derivative usage: The coefficient on LnAsset is positive
and highly significant (a4 = 0.271, p-value < 0.001). In other words, the results reported in Table 4
strongly support our hypothesis H3.
Hypothesis H4 argues that opportunistic managers may engage in derivative transactions because
of the private benefits these arrangements entail. Accordingly, this hypothesis predicts a negative
coefficient on the variable ManagerRun as manager-run municipalities likely face lower agency
problems. However, the results presented in Table 4 do not support this conjecture. The coefficient
on ManagerRun is not statistically significant (a5 = 0.041, p-value = 0.561). As discussed in Section 3.4,
it is possible that agency conflicts in municipal setting do not translate into significant differences in
derivative usage because not only municipal officials, but residents too are likely risk averse.
Our final hypothesis (hypothesis H5) investigates whether the popular view that savvy investment
bankers lure unsophisticated city officials into derivative contracts is supported by the data. If the
above assertion is true, we would observe a negative relation between managerial sophistication
and municipal derivative usage. On the other hand, if it is the relatively sophisticated officials who
engage in derivative transactions while those who are less sophisticated stay away, then the relation
between derivative usage and managerial sophistication should be positive. The results reported in
Table 4 are consistent with the latter, but not the former conjecture. The coefficient on the variable
GFOA is positive and significant (a6 = 0.212, p-value = 0.048), indicating that municipalities with GFOA
certification are more likely to use derivatives.
We also find that when compared with cities, counties are less likely to use derivatives: The
coefficient on County is negative and significant (a7 = 0.131, p-value = 0.076).
6.2.2. Analyses on the extent of derivative usage
Model (2) investigates the determinants of the extent of derivative usage in the U.S. municipalities.
We restrict theModel (2) analyses formunicipalities that do hold derivatives. These results are reported
in Table 5. It appears that Model (2) is well specified too. Model (2) reports an adjusted R-squared of
58.5%.
Table 4
Municipalities’ propensity to use derivatives.
ProbðDeriv ¼ 1Þ
¼ a1Leverageþ a2CreditRating þ a3PopGrowthþ a4LnAsset þ aSManagerRunþ a6GFOA þ a7Countyþ ajYear
þ akRegionþ E ð1Þ
Marginal effect P-value
LEVERAGE a1 1.065*** 0.000
CREDITRATING a2 0.198*** 0.000
POPGROWTH a3 1.393 0.520
LNASSET a4 0.271*** 0.000
MANAGERRUN a5 0.041 0.561
GFOA a6 0.212** 0.048
COUNTY a7 0.131* 0.076
YEAR FIXED EFFECT Yes
REGION FIXED EFFECT Yes
Observations 336
Adjusted R-squared 0.52
This table reports probit regression results for Model (1). The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of one if a
municipality uses at least one of three types of derivative instruments (interest rate, foreign exchange rate, and commodity) in a
given year and zero otherwise. The coefficients reported are marginal effects, measuring the change in the expected value of y as
one independent variable increases by unity while all other variables are kept constant. The regression controls for year and
region fixed effect. P-values are reported next to coefficients. See Table 2 notes for variable definitions.
* Significance at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Significance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Significance at the 1% level (two-sided).
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Overall, results reported in Table 5 are quite similar to those from Table 4. In other words, it
appears that factors that drive the propensity to use derivatives also influence the extent of derivative
usage in municipalities. Turning to specific coefficients, we find that the coefficient on the variable
Leverage is positive and significant (a1 = 1002.089, p-value < 0.001) while that on CreditRating is
negative and significant (a2 = 195.291, p-value = 0.005). These findings support the hypothesis H1
and indicate that financially constrained municipalities are likely to use derivatives more extensively.
As in Table 4, the coefficient on PopGrowth is not statistically significant (a3 =1,134.041,
p-value = 0.712) and thus, our growth hypothesis (hypothesis H2) is not supported. Indicating a positive
association between the extent of derivative usage and size, the coefficient on LnAsset is positive and
significant (a4 = 3569.868, p-value < 0.001). Therefore, we find support for the size hypothesis
(hypothesis H3).
As in Table 4, we do not find evidence consistent with managerial opportunism hypothesis
(hypothesis H4). Coefficient on the variable of interest ManagerRun is not significant
(a5 = 164.257, p-value = 0.185). While Table 4 revealed a significantly positive coefficient on GFOA,
this coefficient is statistically insignificant in Table 5 (a6 = 41.675, p-value = 0.831). While managerial
sophistication, measured in terms of GFOA certification, seems to be positively associated with the use
of derivatives, it does not appear to influence the extent of derivative usage.
We also find that, when compared with cities, the extent of derivative usage in counties is lower.
The coefficient on County is negative and significant (a6 = 314.426, p-value = 0.008).
In sum, the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 provide strong support for financial constraints
hypothesis (hypothesis H1) and size hypothesis (hypothesis H3) in terms of both the propensity
to use derivatives and the extent of derivative usage. But we fail to find evidence consistent with
growth hypothesis (hypothesis H2) and managerial opportunism hypothesis (hypothesis H4)
in either dimension. Contrary to our predictions of managerial sophistication hypothesis
(hypothesis H5), we find limited evidence to suggest that sophisticated managers are more likely
to engage in derivative transactions. However, this does not appear to be the case with respect to
the extent of derivative usage.
Table 5
Determinants of the extent of derivative usage in the U.S. municipalities.
DerivNV ¼ ao þ a1Leverageþ a2CreditRating þ a3PopGrowth þ a4LnAsset þ aSManagerRunþ a6GFOAþ a7County
þ ajYear þ akRegionþ E ð2Þ
Coefficient P-value
LEVERAGE a1 1002.089*** 0.000
CREDITRATING a2 195.291*** 0.005
POPGROWTH a3 1134.041 0.712
LNASSET a4 569.868*** 0.000
MANAGERRUN a5 164.257 0.185
GFOA a6 41.6754 0.831
COUNTY a7 314.426*** 0.008
INTERCEPT a0 7068.501*** 0.000
YEAR FIXED EFFECT Yes
REGION FIXED EFFECT Yes
Observations 184
Adj. R-squared 0.585
This table reports OLS regression for the regression on determinants of derivative usage, for the subsample of municipalities
used derivatives in the sample period. The dependent variable is the notional value of total derivative instruments for a
municipality in a certain year (in millions). The regression controls for year and region fixed effects. P-values are reported next
to the coefficients. See Table 2 notes for variable definitions.
⁄ Significance at the 10% level (two-sided).
⁄⁄ Significance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** denote significance at the 1 percent level (two-sided).
S. Khumawala et al. / J. Account. Public Policy 35 (2016) 303–325 321
6.3. Additional analyses
6.3.1. Alternative empirical measures
In our main analyses, we use population growth to proxy for growth needs of municipalities. In
untabulated tests, we use alternative measures of revenue growth and asset growth to capture
growth. Use of these alternative measures does not alter our inferences with respect to growth
hypothesis. Our results also remain unchanged when we measure growth as a forward-looking
construct (i.e. from year t to t + 1) as opposed to a backward looking one (year t  1 to t). Additionally,
our inferences on size hypothesis (H3) remain unaffected when we capture size in terms of total rev-
enue or population.
6.3.2. Subsample analyses
6.3.2.1. Large versus small municipalities. The preceding analyses find strong support for financial con-
straints (H1) and size (H3) hypotheses, but not for growth (H2), managerial opportunism (H4) and
managerial sophistication (H5) hypotheses. In light of these findings, we investigate whether there
are incremental differences between large and small municipalities with respect to how these factors
affect their derivative usage. Our investigation is motivated by suggestions made by regulators and the
popular press that managerial opportunism/sophistication issues relating to derivatives could differ
between small and large entities. For example, Richardson (2005), reports the following concern raised
by the chief of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s municipal-securities unit, Martha Haines:
‘‘The proliferation of swaps among smaller municipalities in recent years concerns me because these
things are complicated. . . I’m concerned that little guys are getting in and don’t know what they’re
doing.”
Accordingly, we define the dummy variable Small to take the value of one for municipalities that
are small and zero for those that are large in terms of sample median total assets and interact Small
with the variables employed in Model (1).15,16 These results are reported in Table 6. Our focus is on
the interaction variables as they indicate the differences between small and large municipalities.
Results reported in Table 6 reveal no statistically discernible differences between small and large
municipalities in terms of Leverage, CreditRating, and PopGrowth. We find the interaction coefficient
onManagerRun ⁄ Small to be weakly positive, suggesting that managerial opportunism is less of a con-
cern for smaller municipalities (coefficient size = 0.262, p-value = 0.061). Interestingly, we also find
that the coefficient on the interaction term GFOA ⁄ Small is negative and significant (coefficient
size = 4.998, p-value = 0.014), while that on GFOA is positive and significant (coefficient
size = 0.512, p-value = 0.001). In other words, these results indicate that more sophisticated officials
are more likely to use derivatives in large municipalities, while less sophisticated officials are more
likely to use derivatives in smaller municipalities. This finding adds some credence to the concern that
smaller entities might engage in derivative transactions that they do not fully understand.
6.3.2.2. Derivative types. As previously mentioned, the vast majority of derivative users employ inter-
est rate related derivatives. While 11% and three percent of derivative users engage in exchange rate
and commodity price related derivative transactions respectively, the number of municipality-years
that employ these instruments, but not interest rate derivatives, is only 10. While our inferences
are not sensitive to whether we define usage in terms of total derivatives or interest rate derivative
only, we do not have a sufficient sample size to conduct separate tests on entities that only employ
exchange rate and commodity price derivatives.
Similarly, the most commonly used instrument type is swaps. We have only 21 observations where
derivative users do not employ swaps but employ other instruments such as options, swaptions, and
forward/futures contracts. All our results remain unchanged regardless of whether we pool all deriva-
tive types together or separately analyze swap users. Small sample size prevents us from conducting
separate tests on entities that exclusively use options, swaptions, and forward/futures contracts.
15 We do not include LnAssets in the regression since partitioning is based on size.
16 In untabulated tests we carry out similar analyses with Model (2) as well and find similar results.
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6.3.2.3. Counties versus cities. About 70% of our sample consists of cities (239 observations) while the
remaining 30% account for counties (98 observations). In our main analyses, we pool these observa-
tions together and employ the dummy variable County to account for systematic differences between
the two types of entities, if any. Our results are similar when we run separate regressions for city and
county subsamples, but statistical significance becomes weaker, especially for counties. We attribute
this to lack of power due to much smaller sample size.
7. Conclusions
Despite widespread usage of derivatives in the municipality sector and numerous cases of ill-
designed derivative agreements causing severe financial problems for cities and counties, the aca-
demic literature on this area is still at a nascent stage. Our study is an attempt to fill this void by
understanding the nature and the determinants of derivative usage among U.S. cities and counties.
We do so by examining the derivative usage in a hand-collected sample of over 300 observations from
large U.S. cities and counties over the period of 2005–2008.
Our descriptive analyses indicate that derivative usage among municipal governments has grown
rapidly over recent years and is dominated by instruments (primarily swaps) designed to hedge inter-
est rate exposure. With respect to the determinants of derivative usage, we find that financial con-
straints and size positively impact not only the propensity to use derivatives, but also the extent of
derivative usage. On the other hand, we find no reliable association between growth and derivative
usage. Moreover, despite concerns raised in the popular press that opportunistic behavior and/or lack
Table 6
Propensity to use derivatives: large versus small municipalities.
ProbðDeriv ¼ 1Þ
¼ a1Smallþ a2Leverageþ a3Leverage  Small þ a4CreditRating þ aSCreditRating  Smallþ a6Popgrowth
þ a7Popgrowth  Smallþ a8ManagerRunþ a9ManagerRun  Smallþ a1oGFOAþ a11GFOA  Small
þ a12Countyþ a13County  Smallþ ajYear þ akRegionþ E ð3Þ
Marginal effect P-value
SMALL a1 0.861 0.107
LEVERAGE a2 0.688** 0.015
LEVERAGE ⁄ SMALL a3 0.626 0.183
CREDITRATING a4 0.307*** 0.000
CREDITRATING ⁄ SMALL a5 0.088 0.409
POPGROWTH a6 1.971 0.496
POPGROWTH ⁄ SMALL a7 3.315 0.436
MANAGERRUN a8 0.141 0.192
MANAGERRUN ⁄ SMALL a9 0.262* 0.061
GFOA a10 0.512*** 0.001
GFOA ⁄ SMALL a11 4.998** 0.014
COUNTY a12 0.196* 0.066
COUNTY ⁄ SMALL a13 0.131 0.333
YEAR FIXED EFFECT Yes
REGION FIXED EFFECT Yes
Observations 336
Adjusted R-squared 0.32
This table reports probit regression results for Model (3). Small = 1 if a municipality’s total assets is below the median of total
assets in the sample, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of one if a municipality uses at
least one of three types of derivative instruments (interest rate, foreign exchange rate, and commodity) in a given year and zero
otherwise. The coefficients reported are marginal effects, measuring the change in the expected value of y as one independent
variable increases by unity while all other variables are kept constant. The regression controls for year and region fixed effect. P-
values are reported next to coefficients. See Table 2 notes for variable definitions.
* Significance at the 10% level (two-sided).
** Significance at the 5% level (two-sided).
*** Significance at the 1% level (two-sided).
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of financial sophistication of city officials may drive municipal derivative usage, we find no broad evi-
dence to indicate that municipals are more likely to use derivatives and/or are likely to use more
derivatives when agency conflicts are higher or when city officials are likely less sophisticated. How-
ever, we find some evidence suggesting that managerial sophistication and the propensity to use
derivatives is positively associated with larger municipalities, while this association is negative for
smaller municipalities. This finding provides some validity for the concerns raised by regulators and
popular press that smaller municipalities are susceptible to entering into derivative transactions that
they do not fully understand.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to systematically investigate the determinants
of derivative usage in the U.S. municipality sector. Our hand-collected sample is quite large in
comparison to prior empirical work on government sector derivative usage. Nonetheless, we cannot
completely rule out the possibility that failure to find statistically significant results for some of our
hypotheses is due to low statistical power. A related concern is that some of our empirical proxies
may not be powerful enough to fully capture the underlying conceptual construct.
Considering the magnitude of the municipal derivative market and the importance of the munic-
ipal sector for social welfare of citizens, our understanding of the derivative usage among U.S. munic-
ipalities is clearly lacking. Our paper is an initial attempt to shed some light on this issue. Future
researchers may use our findings as a steppingstone to gain a more comprehensive understanding
of municipal derivative usage. In this context, developing theories on derivative usage as they apply
to municipal sector, gathering larger samples, and developing more precise empirical measures to cap-
ture underlying constructs would prove useful. Recognizing the need to understand more fully the use
of derivatives in the governmental sector, in 2008 the Governmental Accounting Standard Board
(GASB) issued Statement No. 53 on Accounting and Financial Reporting for Derivative Instruments
(GASB 53), which mandates derivatives to be recorded at fair value in the statement of net assets.
An investigation of the impact of GASB 53 on derivative usage of municipalities would add to the
extant body of literature on disclosure issues in the municipality sector (e.g., Cheng, 1992; Soybel,
1992; Gore, 2004; Baber and Gore, 2008). We leave these issues for future researchers.
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